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A sustainable practice: Rethinking nature in cultural research
Emily Potter*
University of Melbourne, Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning, Melbourne, Australia
I start this paper with a question that is also a provocation: how sustainable is a cultural
studies that does not take account of nature? What I propose is that before we speculate on
how this field can engage with the environmental concerns that face us this question must
first be asked. For what cultural studies can offer in the face of ecological stress, I will
argue, is circumscribed by its own traditions. If the logics or conceptual parameters of the
discipline resist an accommodation of the conditions of sustainability then we have little to
offer. Yet if this is the case, what is the future of cultural studies given not only the current
import of environmental issues but also the challenge that these material circumstances
raise to our dominant traditions of research? Through a discussion of the limits of social
constructivism and the prevalence of deconstructive critique in cultural studies, this paper
thinks through what an alternative practice might be. It looks to the theoretical and
practical application of assemblage, or gathering, as a generative tool for cultural research,
and speculates that what we need at this time is a double agenda: to make our own
discipline sustainable as we mobilize the particular capacities, methods and knowledges of
cultural research in response to ecological distress.
Nature in cultural studies
Cultural studies has recently found itself the subject of criticism from amongst its own for
its long-standing neglect of environmental concerns. According to Gay Hawkins and
Stephen Muecke, two of the writers to foreground this topic, this neglect is strategic: in
order to demarcate its field, cultural studies had to distinguish itself from ‘the domain of
the natural’. Despite the discipline’s objection to dichotomous approaches to knowledge,
cultural studies contributes to one of the most pervasive and long-standing dichotomies in
Western culture by its insistence that ‘culture is more or less everything (high or low,
mainstream or marginal, and so on)’ (Muecke 2007, 16).1 Positioned outside the remit of
cultural studies’ interest, nature becomes a monolithic entity, a counterpoint for the
complexity and diversity of the socially produced. While multicultures are countenanced,
multinatures are not.2 The result is a centralization of the human as actor and source of
locally produced knowledge against a backdrop of passive, universalized nature.
Of course, the reaction of cultural studies, in its origins, against biological
determinism, or naturalized humanism, and the scientific purchase on reality, was a
significant rationale for its focus on culture and cultural contingency as the site of meaning
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making.3 The idea that ‘truth’ or ‘the real’ were objective elements, somewhere ‘out
there’, and to which only certain, privileged (scientific or ‘rational’) knowledges had
access, was an important political – and critical – motivation for the discipline. However,
rather than liberating nature from its position in the enlightenment story, where human
inquiry would expose all its secrets, cultural studies has largely re-captured the
environment in a limiting narrative of social constructivism and interpretation.4 In this
pursuit of critical purchase, cultural studies threatens to disavow the possibility that nature
can be anything more than a source of cultural power.
Here, the living contours and energies of the non-human world are conceptually
dematerialized – which means making an effective contribution to the material-grounded
agenda of environmental sustainability difficult. The familiar argument that cultural
studies’ fascination with representation, taken to its extreme, reduces the ‘real world’ to a
text, holds some weight in the face of a material world that cannot be accounted for by its
tangible, and thus mutable, material actuality. This non-human materiality does not just
signify: it does things, setting off reactions and influencing change within human cultural
systems. Yet in the traditions of social constructivism, empirical practice and the material
real will always conceal subjective values. In this perspective, it is because of what we do
to the natural world, culturally, that brings it into the realm of meaning; moreover, it is
through the process of critique that cultural researchers can come closer to the truth –
reality becomes the ideology that sustains certain practices and systems, rather than the
milieu in which ideologies emerge.
Nigel Thift, a cultural geographer highly critical of the representational traditions of
cultural theory, has described this rejection of empiricism in preference of cultural
narrative as a total disjuncture between physical and discursive worlds. We lay our ‘webs
of significance’ over the ‘physical substrate’, he argues, locating ourselves in the world
though representation, which ‘must be affixed prior to any attempt of engagement’ (1999,
300). The spatialized description of representational work is telling here. Imaginatively,
the human subject is positioned in specific and certain physical relation to the non-human
world, distanced from a material environment by the power to bestow meaning. In this
arrangement it becomes logical to see human actancy as operating upon rather than amidst
non-human materiality, and as creative capacity residing in the disembodied and
disconnected human mind alone. Elsewhere, in sympathy with Thift’s position, this has
been described as the ‘deadening effect’ of cultural theory that renders inert and fixed ‘all
that ought to be most lively’ (Lorimer 2005, 83, 84–5).
Unsustaining critique
The position that there is no ‘unbiased access to truth’ (Latour 2004, 227), an idea through
which cultural studies has significantly made its mark, sits at odds with the empirical
evidence that makes apparent, to our cognizance, the environmental challenges facing the
world, and the assemblages of the material and immaterial – which I will discuss shortly –
through which the real manifests. So what use is a cultural studies that deadens the
complexity of its own worldly situation? The persuasions of critical scepticism have
perhaps exceeded the intentions of the discipline. According to Bruno Latour, the
popularization of critique through and beyond the academy has turned our own methods
against us. His analysis of the current state – and status – of critique throws up
disconcerting evidence that ‘a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down the wrong
path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, worst of all, to be considered as
friends by the wrong sort of allies . . . ’ (2004, 231). Critique has become a powerful mode
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of denouncing all things (or whatever is convenient) as contestable, subjective and relative
to everything else. Narrow or self-interested political motives become obscured behind the
weight of critique.
Whereas cultural studies’ attention to social constructivism sought to illuminate
material realities so that we could fully understand the discursive and political contexts of
human life, critique has become a means of occluding reality and avoiding responsibility.
Climate change is one example that Latour gives of this. When pushed to address the issue,
it has been the long-term strategy of the American government and, until very recently, the
Australian government to question the ‘certainty’ of scientific data on the veracity of
human-induced climate change (despite overwhelming evidence to support the
proposition), delaying any practical, and material, forms of response. Such a situation
leaves Latour feeling despair – but also the need for a radical change of tack:
What has become of critique when someone as eminent as Stanley Fish . . . believes he
defends science studies . . . by comparing the laws of physics to the rules of baseball? What
has become of critique when there is a whole industry denying that the Apollo program landed
on the moon? . . . What if explanations resorting automatically to power, society, discourse
had outlived their usefulness . . . ? (2004, 228–9)
Critique’s capacity to abstract us from reality rather than bring us closer to it indicates its
limitations for, and even antithesis to, the pursuit of sustainable worlds. As an approach to
knowledge that dismantles but does not create, the current culture of critique will not
provide or nurture the conditions of invention, interconnection and care common to both
sustaining ecologies and, I contend, sustainable research practice. Relatedly, the authority
that critique invests in its own conclusions, garnered at the expense of a previously
constituted fact or practice, is isolating: it enables only the critic to be right. When critical
practice refuses to recognize the multiplicity of knowledges by which we know the world
its deadening effect becomes clear.
Precious things
Before I go on to explore this, I want to offer an example of the oppositional terms that
inform this culture of critique, and how these are riven through intellectual practice, even
under the rubric of interdisciplinary conversation. Earlier this year I participated in a
roundtable discussion that brought together five scholars from the humanities and five
scholars from the techno-sciences to talk about nanotechnology.5 The idea was that the
scientists would outline their research in this field to the humanities scholars who, in turn,
would respond to the topic from their own disciplinary positions. It was an ambitious event
that sought out conversation between different specializations on a shared topic of
concern. Its intention to foreground the relevance of philosophy to what is most commonly
perceived as an interest of science and technology was radical. But in retrospect a
pervasive sense of protectiveness that closed down possibility underlay the day, as if the
revelation of research from each ‘side’ to the other would leave exposed and undefended
the precious things with which we work.
Isabelle Stengers has written on the difficulties of a productive coexistence between
multiple disciplinary practices. As a scientist who is also a philosopher, Stengers is
intrigued by the defensive stance that different practices so often take to each other: for
her, protecting our practices from ‘outside’ attack is not sustaining. It depletes our
intellectual energy, and reaffirms and emboldens the isolation of knowledges. And it also
overlooks the creative capacity of assembled difference. Stengers contends that the claim
to authority over reality is at the heart of a stand-off between and even within science and
Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 173
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humanities disciplines. For instance, the authority claimed by the critic to know reality
through its deconstruction competes with the claim of physical science to an objective and
rational insight into ‘physical reality . . . beyond our merely human fictions’. ‘As a result’,
Stengers writes, ‘physics claims for itself an exclusive position of judgement over and
against all other “realities”’ (2005, 183).
According to Stengers, what is at the heart of such a stand-off is a defence against the
mishandling of one’s own precious things: the particular knowledges and practices of the
discipline. No one, she argues, likes to be told that their tools and materials, and the worlds
in which they materially and imaginatively work, are pure cultural fictions. Indeed, in her
view, it is the mark of a degraded intellectual field when any one account of the world is
totalized: ‘as long as claims such as “physics is a social practice like any other” could be
considered viable and plausible’, she continues, ‘then physicists would be right to be afraid’
(184). Defensive intellectual inquiry is ultimately unproductive. The protective air that
hung over the nanotechnology roundtable signalled opportunities lost rather than new
knowledges gained. With either ‘team’ positioned on opposite sides of the room, the
implication was that our differences represented a ‘face off’ of sorts: that while the sciences
uncover and constitute material reality, the humanities, confined to a textual account of the
world, work to disassemble it. From this predetermined position, the interests that gathered
around the concern of nanotechnology on that day were thus charged with the unproductive
task (in this context at least) of convincing each other that what they had to say was of value.
Assembling practice
Stengers’ response to this defensive relationship between different disciplinary practices is
to advocate an ‘ecology of practices’ as an innovative ‘tool for thinking through’ what
concerns us (185). The ecology of practices model is an alternative approach to the
‘warring’ of knowledges around a given topic: its view is that no single practice can claim
authority in its access to reality, and proceeds by the demand ‘that no practice be defined as
“like any other”, just as no living species is like any other’. That is, the divergence of
practices is a point of engagement. Stengers explains:
Approaching a practice . . . [means] feeling its borders, experimenting with the questions
which practitioners may accept as relevant, even if they are not their own questions, rather
than imposing insulting questions that lead them to mobilise and transform the border into a
defence against their outside. (184)
Within this ecology, disciplinary boundaries signal the space of relations between
practices as active and meaningful rather than as a site of irreconcilable difference. An
ecology of practices insists that reality will not be revealed by a single knowledge: what is
real appears incrementally as knowledges cluster and brew. These knowledges are situated
and contingent, informed by local conditions, both material and discursive, that make an
omniscient viewpoint impossible. By recognizing what attaches practitioners to their
particular interests and methods, the fantasy of the nomadic scholar, ‘free to go
everywhere, to enter any practical territory, to judge, deconstruct or disqualify . . . ’ (191)
is fundamentally challenged.
Stengers’ take on a complex world that no one practice can explain away complements
Latour’s analysis of critique, and its disavowal of what he argues is a gathering reality
constituted by ‘matters of concern’ (2004, 233). These matters of concern are assemblages
of interests, energies, materials and stories that are distinct from matters of fact, and the
latter is only ever a partial rendering of the former. This intervention into the politics of
fact enables cultural research to move beyond a role limited to critique and interpretation.
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Facts are not the grist in the mill of knowledge-making but instead assemble, with other
forces and entities, to produce and bring us closer to matters of concern.
In order to elaborate his point Latour raises a range of phenomena as different as the
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, climate change, colon cancer and a work of
art. These speak clearly of the challenge that this epistemological shake-up makes to
disciplinary practices dependent upon the demarcations of nature/culture and
text/materiality. As a matter of concern, 11 September was a geo-political event, but it
also employed the laws of physics, the domain of media, and manifested in the dust that
fell like a blanket across New York. Similarly, while climate change presents itself
through the oxidization of carbon and environmental transformations, its reality is equally
produced in policy, economy, and the individual who chooses to ride her bike to work
rather than drive. More than the linear production of an event, these examples indicate the
assembled nature of what presents itself to us as things that are neither natural nor cultural,
but naturecultural.
The naturecultural critic
Matters of concern demand a revised empirical approach for cultural studies, and I propose
the notion of the naturecultural critic as a way of thinking through what our alternative
methods could be. In contrast to the traditions of cultural critique, the naturecultural critic
doesn’t look to debunk but is open to what assembles – both human and non-human – in
the field of real relations around a matter of concern. Here, nature is not something that
signifies on the outskirts of culture; it is entwined in the worlds we inhabit, the knowledges
we produce and in our own human constitution. And because there is no single reality in a
matter of concern, the naturecultural critic takes assemblage as a guide for research
practice too. She thinks critically without hierarchizing knowledge, and isolating
expertise. This is a modest approach to inquiry that is self-reflective, understanding one’s
own conceptual tools as just some of many ways of exploring and saying the world.
The dialogic set-up of the nanotechnology roundtable (science face to face with the
humanities) determined its lack of success, bringing only two, traditionally oppositional
parties to bear on what is an unsettled and complex matter of concern. A more productive
model for the event might have been to facilitate an assemblage of speakers from a variety
of arenas in which nanotechnology presents itself – including, for instance, economists,
agriculturalists, and builders alongside scientists and cultural researchers. Without
foreclosing on a potential range of participants, the gesture of invitation asserts temporary
limits in which the experimental ground of discussion can take place.
A recent project with which I have been involved applied this approach to the
production of an edited collection on water cultures, politics and histories in Australia. The
book came out of a one-day workshop where scholars from a range of disciplinary fields –
from environmental science and indigenous studies to visual arts and urban planning –
were invited to bring their particular knowledges to bear on this issue of environmental
and social crisis.6 What this diversity of perspectives ensured was that no single
knowledge could claim authoritative ground over the others. There was no need for
defence. Water, as a concern for sustainability, was recognized as an assembling material
and immaterial force – a naturecultural phenomenon – that demands a multi-question
(and open-ended) approach. The resulting collection is self-consciously far from ‘the last
word’ on water in Australia, even while its gathering of experts leads us to an innovative
place for understanding the worldliness of this concern, as an issue caught up in an ecology
of lives, interests and ambitions.7
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A revised empirical practice for cultural research could thus be described, in Latour’s
terms, as ‘a multifarious inquiry launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy,
metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how many participants are gathering in a thing to
make it exist and to maintain its existence’ (246; emphasis in original). This inquiry has no
pretence to smooth objectivity: our own worldly situation means that ‘experience and
experimentation’ (245) admit as empirical evidence how non-human things, and our
everyday, contingent entanglements with them, provoke us to think and move us to act. In
these terms, experimentation might mean to think materially, to conceptualize non-human
entities as research collaborators and to work through the questions that this more-than-
human collaboration would pose.
It is important to acknowledge that a reintegration of the material in cultural research
has been underway for some time, particularly in areas such as cultural geography, techno-
cultural studies, and studies of affect. The problem is that non-human materiality, more
often than not, takes a backseat to a focus on human embodiment, on how we can know in
material, sensuous ways. There has been relatively little focus, in comparison, on the
‘knowing’ of the non-human world, its resistance to our designs, and the formative
power – in both theory and practice – of what Hawkins terms this ‘material recalcitrance’
of the world (2006).
A worldly laboratory
The purpose of this paper has not been to reject the representational work of so much
cultural studies but rather to offer a provocation to research traditions that rely upon
divisions of nature and culture, science and humanities, text and materiality. To think
about our work as active and engaged in an assembling reality rather than standing, all
knowing, outside it, puts collaborative approaches to knowledge in the frame for new,
experimental and creative research endeavours in which nothing speaks at the expense of
something else. Creativity, after all, is something that the challenge of sustainability in a
world, to cite John Law, ‘taken to be composed of an excess of generative forces and
relations’ (2004, 9), surely requires. So the assembling nature of things inspires a different
praxis as well as theory.
I am currently involved in both studying and participating in several projects of
creative research. Creative research is a practice of undertaking research in the process of
making creative works. It is one quite evident way of materializing thought, where
knowledge is generated in the real empirical relations of a local situation. A commonality
of these projects is collaboration: between diverse artistic practices, between artist and
researcher, but also between whatever entities and energies present themselves in relation
to the matter of concern that the particular creative work engages: this can make for a
surprising range of collaborators – some human, some non-human.
In one of these creative research projects, entitledMallee, the question of remaking rural
environments brings a group of artists, writers and researchers together with farmers,
technologies, government bodies, private industry, local communities, and the environment
itself: all active in a field of concern.Mallee sets up a temporary andmobilemeeting ground
produced by the confluence of interests, in which to postulate and test – amongst other
things – different ways of thinking about community and environment. It proceeds from the
assumption that everything – every force, every matter, every practice, every word and
object – is potentially part of its field of concern. At the same time, it does not actively seek
the participation of all interested parties (which would be an impossibility anyway: how
could we name an infinity of interests?). But what it does is to remain open to their possible
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inclusion. Mallee is an attractor; a gathering point for individuals and things (humans and
non-humans) from a variety of places, whose situation or intention is not necessarily known
or mapped out in advance. In this sense, the project is what it becomes; its outcome is
determined by process. Negotiation and a large element of uncertainty as to where this
project will go, and what it will produce, are its characteristics – what does emerge will
matter differently, on its own terms, for each party involved.
While this is a too-brief description of this work, the point I really want to end on is
that assembly, as a research method, is inherently speculative – its outcome cannot be
predetermined. And it also refuses the extraction of the critic from what becomes reality.
In these instances of creative collaboration, the divergence between particular, embodied
and textualized practices, gathering in a certain time and place, generates the quivering
conditions in which knowledge emerges, outside the rationale of schedules and
programmes, and the omniscience of the elevated observer. In this way assemblage is a
process and a method, rather than an end point for analysis.
This, then, is a laboratory where experimentation means an open invitation to
emergence, disappearance and surprise. It is a lively arena produced by, and with its
findings contingent upon, gatherings. In this laboratory, released from the imperative to
‘write down truth’ (Muecke 2004, 8), the particular material inventiveness of cultural
research is manifest. And in line with the radical empiricism of William James, nothing is
potentially excluded from creative effect – including the researchers themselves. ‘So what
if we think of the philosopher as a helpmeet, as someone who can help something grow?’
Muecke asks. ‘How would they do that without getting in people’s way? They do it, I
would suggest, by participating’ (2004, 167).
Critical work absents creativity when it doesn’t invite the engagement of other
practices, when it doesn’t see itself as assembling different methods and knowledges. This
is a tension for an environmentally conscious cultural studies that relies on traditions of de-
assembly, hierarchy and disconnection. The answer is not simply to insert nature into
cultural studies but to rethink our practice in light of the conditions of a sustainable
ecology: inclusive, transformative, and responsive to difference. We need to return to the
materiality of thought both for ethical reasons and in the interests of intellectual inquiry,
because how can we really think about ‘how things are’ without working in, or at least
countenancing, the generative work of real relations? In a renewed empiricism, one that
attends to the assemblage of entities and forces as a mode of knowledge garnering, the
consideration of what a practice does in its situated entanglements, rather than what it fails
to do, is a necessary and ultimately more generative tactic for cultural research.
Notes
1. Gay Hawkins has mounted this argument in many oral presentations, and it informs her study
The Ethics of Waste.
2. This concept is from B. Latour, The Politics of Nature (Harvard University Press, 2004) cited in
Muecke (2007).
3. See the Introduction in Anderson (2007) for a useful discussion of critical theory and the politics
of nature and racial identity.
4. There are some exceptions to this, of course, on the margins of cultural studies: the work of
Donna Haraway, for example.
5. ‘Nanotechnology and the Humanities Roundtable’, University of South Australia, 16 February
2007.
6. ‘Water Justice: Unlearning Indifference in Freshwater Ecologies’ symposium, State Library of
South Australia, 9–10 September 2005.
7. See Potter et al. (2007).
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